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Abstract 
New legal frameworks for oil and gas have been created in Ghana, Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Kenya and Liberia since 2013 to put in place local content policies (LCPs). There are a number of 
reasons why such policies have become popular with African governments for petroleum and 
mining. Beginning with Angola and Nigeria and moving to the newer adopters of these policies, a 
general weakening of oil and gas LCPs in Sub-Saharan Africa indicates a ‘softer’ approach to 
regulation over time and a the emergence of a more pro-business agenda. This paper seeks to 
conduct an in-depth survey of LCPs in oil and gas across sub-Saharan Africa in order to identify 
differing approaches and analyze emerging trends in the legal and institutional frameworks within 
which local content frameworks are enacted and within which they will be implemented in order to 
advance petro-development in Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
Local content policies are proliferating across Sub-Saharan Africa. From traditional exporters of 
copper, gold and other metals to the many newly oil-rich states, new policies are being crafted as 
new resource discoveries set off a rush to put in place legal frameworks to govern their extraction. 
Since 2013, Ghana, Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya and Liberia have passed new legislation 
to govern the exploration and production of oil and gas. In the past few years, local content policies 
(LCPs) have also garnered new attention from numerous international institutions and donor 
agencies. However, studies tend to focus on mining, and even when they look at oil and gas, LCPs 
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are not often studied comprehensively. LCPs may temporarily relieve the pressure African 
governments feel to respond to expectations that have grown out of control even as oil prices 
continue to fall. However, if LCPs are not properly implemented, the relief will be time-limited. 
Lastly, in both oil and mining, LCPs are most popular when they are vague and not targeted at 
specific services or objectives. This lack of more refined policy objectives may limit the 
developmental benefit of local content.  
 
The emerging petroleum regimes in Africa have been subjected to varying levels of individual 
scrutiny both from domestic non-governmental organizations and from international civil society 
organizations. The Natural Resource Governance Institute1 has reviewed many of these laws while 
the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment2 has surveyed local content frameworks in a number 
of countries. Both the World Bank Oil, Gas & Mining Unit and the OECD Development Centre, 
through the Policy Dialogue on Natural-Resource Based Development, are planning more detailed 
country analysis of local content frameworks in petroleum and mineral extraction. Others have done 
analyses of local content policies that take more thematic approaches and rely on examples from 
different countries as opposed to detailed examination of the various frameworks themselves 
(Ramdoo, 2015). Klueh et al (2009) studied local content in a number of countries, but even as 
recently as 2009 it was only Angola and Nigeria that had notable policies when it came to African oil 
and gas. Hansen et al (2014) have done a case study on local content in Tanzania, Uganda and 
Mozambique, but one that does not focus specifically on the oil sector.  
 
LCPs increase the utilisation of national human and material resources in the extractives sector. In 
the case of petroleum, they domicile in-country oil and gas-related economic activity that was 
                                                            
1 See, for example, recent analyses of legal frameworks for petroleum in Uganda 
(http://www.resourcegovernance.org/news/blog/ugandas-oil-revenue-management-framework-solid-start-
not-nearly-enough) and Ghana (http://www.resourcegovernance.org/news/blog/ghanas-petroleum-
exploration-and-production-bill-steps-forward-room-improvement)  
2 See http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/local-content-laws-contractual-provisions/  
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previously located abroad. Local content policies promote indigenous participation in economies 
otherwise geared for the export of raw materials. They also encourage the development of local 
manufacturing and service provision through backward, forward and sideways linkages along the 
value chain for natural resources. In petroleum, LCPs work by encouraging and/or requiring 
exploration and production firms to use local companies for the procurement of goods and services 
and multinational oil service companies (OSCs) to domicile economic activities in the countries of 
extraction.  
 
Physical and human capital development are also central to LCPs and fundamental for socio-
economic development. Despite the small numbers of jobs available in oil and gas, the large number 
of goods and services needed for oil exploration and production offer numerous possibilities for 
employment. The oil and gas industry can only contribute to meaningful development through a 
combination of both appropriate investment of revenues and the development of productive 
linkages between the oil and non-oil economies. Taken together, these two approaches offer the 
possibility of petro-development in Africa (Ovadia, 2016b). 
 
This paper is based upon an in-depth survey of LCPs in oil and gas across Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Through comparative analysis of the content of these new frameworks and the legal and 
institutional frameworks within which local content frameworks are enacted, I identify differing 
approaches taken by various African countries to petro-development. Overall, early adopters of LCPs 
in oil and gas have chosen ‘hard LCPs’ (concrete targets and regulations) while late adopters are 
largely opting for ‘soft LCPs’ (focused on training, competitiveness and voluntary shared value 
creation). This trend suggests a weakening in LCPs over time that may be the result of lobbying 
efforts by international companies, investors and Western governments.  
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Resource-based development has been widely studied in recent years. The ‘Making the Most of 
Commodities Programme’3 led to UNECA’s 2013 report on local linkages by the same authors. 
UNECA followed this up in 2014 with a report on dynamic industrial policies that focuses on the ways 
global value chain analysis can help create linkages between extractive industries and other sectors 
of the economy. As described in Ovadia (2014), several similar reports released around the same 
time from the OECD, UNDP, African Union, UNIDO, African Development Bank, and Africa Progress 
Panel also focused on resource-based development.4 Work on resource-based development begins 
with the insight that natural resources can have unique developmental potential. As I have noted 
elsewhere (Ovadia, 2016a), this is not a new idea, but one that in recent years has worked in reverse 
in the form of arguments about a so-called ‘resource curse’. The possibility of ‘positive oil 
exceptionalism’ does not deny that resources often have negative impacts but rather, as many 
authors have pointed out (Obi, 2010; Saad Filho and Weeks, 2013; Heilbrunn, 2014), that the 
resource curse thesis is highly deterministic. The insight that different policy options implemented in 
different social, political and economic contexts will bring about different developmental outcomes 
is the starting point for the analysis that follows.  
 
In some respects, the scope for positive outcomes/positive oil exceptionalism has narrowed due to 
the fall in the price of oil. At the same time, the study of oil-backed economic development through 
LCPs is now even more important given the limits of development through the revenues from 
petroleum resources alone. Local content offers the oil and gas industry a development strategy the 
can promote economic diversification and growth in the non-oil economy. Such structural 
transformation, industrialization and diversification is the only path to long-term and sustainable 
economic and social development. In the wake of the oil price shock, LCPs can therefore be 
understood as more important for oil-rich developing countries, not less. Additionally, as the 
                                                            
3 See http://www.commodities.open.ac.uk/mmcp and Morris Kaplinsky, and Kaplan (2012). 
4 See Africa Mining Vision (2011); UNDP (2012); UNCTAD (2012); UNIDO (2012); Africa Progress Panel (2013); 
UNECA (2013); AEO (2014); UNECA (2014) for a sample of such material. 
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currencies of Africa’s oil producers are devalued with the fall of oil, the possibilities for encouraging 
domestic manufacturing and service provision increase.  
 
Although there has been a lot of interest in local content policies, there has also been divergence in 
terms of enthusiasm and support for them. The World Bank (Tordo et al, 2013) remains neutral on 
LCPs while the OECD’s draft Framework of Public-Private Collaboration for Shared Resource-Based 
Value Creation5 does not even mention the idea of targets or regulations. While there may merits to 
the idea of public-private partnerships (see Ramdoo, 2015), local content undeniably involves a cost 
to the government and possibly (although not necessarily in the long term) to investors. This cost 
explains the Africa Economic Outlook 2014’s general negativity toward LCPs—although the report 
generalizes about local content in extractive and non-extractive sectors when it notes ‘localisation 
requirements can encourage linkage development’ but can also ‘simultaneously inhibit upgrading 
opportunities further down the value chain’ (AEO, 2014: 193). Such concerns have led to discussions 
about ‘alternatives’ to local content (Kolstad and Kinyondo, 2015). 
 
The analysis below—developed from careful charting of legislation and regulations across the 
continent as well as from interactions with senior government officials6—reveals that although new 
possibilities have opened for what I have called a ‘petro-developmental state’, there have at the 
same time been backward steps. The paper begins with the experience of African oil producers post-
independence, describing early experiences of trying to assert national control and what went 
                                                            
5 Available at http://www.oecd.org/dev/Framework_Public-Private_Collaboration_FINAL.pdf 
6 In addition to analyzing legislation and production sharing contracts, the methodology for this study involved 
observation and participation at oil industry events about local content and development through natural 
resources. Since 2012, I have interacted with senior officials in government regulators and state oil companies 
at a series of at least ten oil industry events. Some of these events may be considered public, others were held 
under ‘Chatham House rules’ and in some the information I gathered was through private conversations or 
communication after the fact. At these events, government and private sector representatives often felt more 
comfortable voicing opinions and information not available in the public domain. Although I was engaging with 
officials in their public capacities, I have chosen to label several interactions in which information was gathered 
as ‘semi-private comments’. To protect their identities, I am including only the year of the event. To what 
extent I identify the position of the informant depends on how identifiable they are and what conditions were 
placed on the event I met them at. 
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wrong.  In section 2, I chart Angola, Nigeria and Ghana’s recent experiences with the adoption of 
local content policies as countries who already have oil production and a record of implementation 
to review. In section 3, the paper moves to review more recent debates and the adoption of local 
content legislation in several emerging African oil producers, namely Uganda, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Kenya and Liberia. The paper then concludes by reviewing new trends and policy 
implications of the push for local content in oil and gas. 
 
In each country described below, a government ministry, department, agency or state-owned 
company is responsible for advancing local content in oil and gas in order to nurture diversified 
economic development and bring about structural transformation. In each case, powerful internal 
and external groups limit the autonomy of these institutions and water down the policies they seek 
to enact. Domestic forces are seeking to direct the benefit of LCPs to local elites while foreign forces 
seek to limit the short-term cost to international capital. To succeed, it will therefore be necessary 
for the genuine and sincere actors implementing LCPs in government, the private sector and in civil 
society organizations to form alliances and build broad-based support in order to accomplish their 
development objectives. 
 
The global commodities boom of the 2000s sparked important new debates on the role of natural 
resources in promoting economic development. A select few African countries have earned massive 
revenues from petroleum resources. Nigeria in particular has received hundreds of billions of dollars 
in the form of rents, royalties and taxes. However, petroleum also provided a major revenue stream 
for Angola, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea. Hundreds of billions of dollars of revenues made little 
impact in the lives of most people in these countries. The new interest in LCPs comes about because 
of the growing recognition that oil revenues alone cannot fuel economic development. Although it 
may be years before it is possible to see how LCPs have played out and to know where they have 
caused economic and social development, the differences in approach, political and economic 
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context and capacity as well as the forces undermining the state-led approach can be better 
understood now to strengthen local content development in African oil industries and identify the 
best path to achieving positive developmental outcomes from petroleum resources. 
 
2. African Oil Experiences: From National Control to Local Content 
In discussing local content and petro-development, it is important to note that there is in fact a very 
long history of failed attempts to promote national control of petroleum resources in Africa. 
National control gained momentum in the 1970s as countries began forming their own national oil 
companies (NOCs). Nigeria created its NOC in 1971—the same year it joined OPEC. The 1973 oil price 
shock increased the influence of OPEC, which began advocating for greater national control and 
socio-economic development through oil revenues. Nigeria began a program of nationalisation and 
indigenisation. By the end of the 1970s, it held 80 percent of the ownership of Shell Nigeria and 60 
percent of the other international oil companies (IOCs) operating in Nigeria as well as equity interest 
in the subsidiaries of several multinational oil service companies. Policies of ‘Nigerianisation’ were 
enacted to encourage the employment of Nigerians in the oil sector and indigenous ownership 
through a variety of quotas and regulations.  
 
Indigenisation in Nigeria was bitterly fought by foreign capital and particularly by the Lagos Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry. The policies ultimately failed to give the Nigerian state effective control 
over the industry and were more about elite capture of oil rents.7 By requiring some equity by 
Nigerian partners, the policies led to the practice of ‘fronting’, whereby a Nigerian citizen acted as a 
front for the foreign company or joint venture while both control of operations and ownership of the 
majority of profits remained with the foreign firm and the equity share given to the Nigerian partner 
                                                            
7 For a more in-depth discussion of indigenization, see Kennedy (1988), Biersteker (1987), Adejugbe (1984), 
Ogbuagu (1983), and Balabkins (1982). 
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was written off as a cost of doing business. In the end, as Claude Ake poignantly wrote, ‘what was 
indigenized… was not control of the economy, but rather exploitation’ (1982: 188). 
 
Following independence in 1975, Angola nationalised the Portuguese company ANGOL de 
Lubrificantes e Combustíveis, creating the national oil company Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis 
(Sonangol). International companies were permitted to operate in Angola in joint ventures and 
contractor agreements with Sonangol, but until 1991 they were only legally allowed to have 49% 
ownership in any venture. Angola was much more successful in asserting national control over its oil 
industry through Sonangol due to Sonangol’s relative power and efficiency (Soares de Oliveira, 
2007). Angola passed several laws beginning in the 1980s that set targets for Angolans employed by 
international companies and instituted a mandatory framework for the training and promotion of 
Angolan employees. However, these laws and regulations were largely ignored by the IOCs (Ovadia, 
2012). The oil industry continued to be an enclave industry, serving until 2002 only to provide hard 
currency for the purchase of weapons in Angola’s civil war. 
 
Early attempts to exert national control reflected the dual objectives of increased sway over a 
strategic sector and increased developmental benefits. In the end, these objectives were superseded 
by elite self-interest and the resistance of foreign capital. Although the ruling party in Angola faced a 
struggle for its very survival and local linkages were certainly out of the question during the civil war, 
Sonangol arguably had the capacity to insist on more Angolanisation—and certainly more training of 
Angolans—if it had put long-term interests ahead of short-term payoffs. In Angola and Nigeria, 
which together still account for 80 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s oil production, attempts to boost 
national control would eventually give way to local content. 
 
With significant interests in Angola and Nigeria, Norway took advantage of Nigeria’s return to civilian 
rule in 1999 and the end of Angola’s civil war in 2002 to champion local content in these countries. 
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The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) sponsored the first study of local 
content in Nigeria in 2002 (see Heum et al, 2003), while Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs signed 
several cooperation agreements with Angola’s Ministry of Petroleum that have supported ongoing 
Angolanisation efforts (Govender and Skagestad, 2009). An approach to oil-backed development 
took hold in both countries that recognised that oil exploration and production companies would 
never be significant employers on their own and instead emphasised local participation and local 
linkages to the oil service sector and beyond.  
 
In Angola, Sonangol began promoting local content through old and new provisions in its contracts 
with IOCs and managed to underline the necessity of investing in local content if companies wanted 
to continue working in Angola. In Nigeria, an emphasis post-1999 on getting foreign companies to 
base their service activities in-country and use as many local suppliers of goods and services as 
possible alongside a continued push for more Nigerian ownership made LCPs much more palatable. 
While IOCs were initially resistant, over time LCPs have gained widespread acceptance and 
legitimacy. IOCs have accepted local content—in some cases begrudgingly and in others 
enthusiastically—though they have become increasingly concerned with cost since the oil price 
shock of 2014. IOCs continue to press for a more voluntary and less regulatory approach, particularly 
through engagement with fora like the OECD Policy Dialogue. So far, Nigeria has resisted such 
pressures and, despite increased scrutiny from the World Trade Organization, underlined their 
commitment to broad policies that target increased local participation across all sectors of the 
economy. 
 
Both countries pushed hard to persuade IOCs to invest in facilities for local manufacturing and 
service provision and insist upon these policies in order to use oil services as an anchor to grow 
indigenous companies that can also participate in the non-oil economy. This strategy is the first step 
toward creating a pathway to economic growth and diversification. However, by refraining from 
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prioritizing sectors in which to build comparative advantage, Angola and Nigeria risk repeating the 
errors of previous attempts at import substitution instead of benefitting from the advantages East 
Asian countries experienced with state-directed export-led industrialization strategies.8 
 
3. Recent Experiences in Angola, Nigeria and Ghana 
 
The continent’s traditional oil producers are now being joined by a number of new entrants and 
aspirants to the club of oil-exporting countries. With new technologies for deep water drilling, 
Angola and Nigeria significantly expanded their oil and gas production. Meanwhile, Ghana has 
become the first new producer from the region to bring oil extraction online. They will likely soon be 
joined by Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania, Liberia, Kenya and others. This section will look more 
closely at LCPs in Angola and Nigeria as well as Ghana, while the next section considers newer 
players and debates. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s two largest oil producers have taken very different approaches to local content. 
Angola’s LCPs came out of a 2001 technical commission overseeing cooperation between the 
Angolan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Petroleum and Sonangol. As shown in 
Figure 1, Decree No. 127/03 required certain oil activities be carried out by partly or fully Angolan 
companies while Decree-Law No. 17/09 covers the participation and training of Angolans. These 
were supplemented by the control Sonangol’s Directorate of Production (D.PRO) and Directorate of 
Economy and Concessions (DEC) have over the awarding of contracts and the Negotiations 
Directorate’s overall coordination of local content. Through the Production Sharing Agreements 
(PSAs) Sonangol has with the various international oil companies operating in Angola, it can also 
require local content. Article 14 (or 13 in some PSAs) allows a preference of 10 percent on cost for  
                                                            
8 Undoubtedly, the conditions in which East Asian countries successfully built developmental states no longer 
exist. However, local content is one of the new factors opening up the possibility of new ‘petro-developmental 
states’ in Africa (Ovadia, 2016b).  
11 
 
 
  
12 
 
local companies and enables Sonangol to push for even more local content through its power to 
review and approve annual work plans and all contracts over a certain amount (Ovadia, 2012). 
Article 36 has provisions covering training and technology transfer. In his review of Sonangol’s 
operations, Heller writes ‘Local content and local staffing are important goals of most NOCs that 
work with international partners, but most international officials who work in Angola indicate that 
Sonangol is tougher about local content and places more emphasis on it than counterpart 
companies in other countries’ (2012: 858). 
 
3.1 Angola 
Sonangol is the key implementing institution for LCPs in Angola. Through consistent prioritisation of 
local content, Angola was also able to exhort IOCs to support local content promotion (Ovadia, 
2014). Sonangol is not the only actor however. In the Ministry of Petroleum, a directorate has been 
created called ‘Direcção Nacional de Fomento a Angolanização’ (National Directorate for the 
Development of Angolanization) to increase and Angolan participation in the petroleum sector 
through what a senior government official calls ‘positive discrimination’. Working with a commission 
of the Angolan parliament, he notes, this directorate was set to look into future LCPs, study the 
question of local content and report back its findings with the intention of drafting new legislation.9 
The country has also passed new laws providing tax incentives to local companies and laws and 
regulations requiring the use of Angolan banks and forcing oil companies to pay taxes and local 
contractors in Angolan currency. Absent quantitative data on the impact of LCPs, my own 
investigations and contacts give me reason to believe the government has met with considerable 
success in its approach. New businesses are supplying goods and services previously supplied by 
foreign companies while larger firms are either partnering with Sonangol or working on their own to 
perform tasks in-country that were previously done abroad. However, there has been a cost to these 
policies, particularly in the wake of the oil price shock of 2014. IOCs also seem to be strengthening 
                                                            
9 Semi-private comments, 2014. 
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their opposition to Angola’s regulatory approach by bringing up the added cost of local content 
requirements publicly in oil and gas forums as well as privately to Angolan officials.10 Additionally, as 
Heller notes, Angola has chosen to some extent to prioritize local content over short-term revenue 
because it ‘serves as a patronage mechanism for the regime's network of supporters and is a key to 
the government's expanding-core economic strategy’ (2012: 860). 
 
3.2 Nigeria 
In Nigeria, local content promotion also began with a workshop in 2001. After first creating a division 
within the NOC in 2005 to promote ‘Nigerian content’, the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content 
Development Act (NCA) was passed in 2010. The law set targets for Nigerian participation in 280 
separate categories on oil services.  Many of these activities are also part of the non-oil economy. 
The list of the various services required for oil exploration and production demonstrates the 
possibilities for local linkages and opportunities for local employment. The NCA also created an 
agency, the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board (NCDMB) to monitor and enforce 
compliance with the NCA. Progress is hard to demonstrate because there is still some difficulty in 
understanding how to measure local content (Ovadia, 2013).  
 
Facing an enormous task in a very difficult context, the NCDMB has done a relatively good job. While 
there are also local content provisions in joint operating agreements and production sharing 
contracts between the national oil company and IOCs, these have never been well enforced. 
Although it is not difficult to find faults with NCDMB in its implementation of the NCA, some 
important improvements have been made and the danger of Nigerian companies serving merely as 
fronts for foreign ones seems to have been largely avoided.  
 
                                                            
10 Semi-private comments, 2015. 
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Through various capacity building initiatives with IOCs (see Ovadia, 2013; 2014), the NCDMB has 
managed to make impressive gains. The NCDMB claims that the national capture of annual 
investment in oil and gas has gone from less than 5 percent to roughly 40 percent. In the fall of 2015, 
an official from the NCDMB claimed that local content was 90 percent in engineering design, 60 
percent in the manufacture of valves and fabrication of subsea systems, and 45 percent in the 
manufacture of high voltage cables.11 However, the NCDMB has also claimed in the past that over 
30,000 new jobs have been created with hundreds of thousands more on the way. While they may 
be overly optimistic, the benefits have been substantial while the amount of investment retained in 
the Nigerian economy is likely several billion dollars annually. The NCDMB also claims that 70 
percent of purchase orders were now given to local companies,12 indicating the success of their 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) scheme (described in Ovadia, 2013; 2014). However, as 
noted with reference to Ghana below, the value of contracts given to local companies can be 
significantly less than the percentage of contracts. Now facing scrutiny from the World Trade 
Organisation, Nigeria’s approach to local content is likely to be challenged. Additionally, the 
promotion of local content seems to be driven more by the IOCs than the government (Ovadia, 
2014). However, in a country that has seen little benefit from over 50 years of oil production, local 
content seems to be working.     
 
3.3 Ghana 
Ghana discovered oil in waters off the Western Region of the country on its 50th anniversary in 2007 
in what became the ‘Jubilee field’ and moved quickly to put in place a policy framework for the 
petroleum industry that laid out goals, objectives and directions. A law passed in 2011, the 
Petroleum Commission Act, set up an agency dedicated to regulating the industry. Ghana’s new 
Local Content Law (GLCL) was passed in November 2013. The law is quite similar to Nigeria’s law, 
                                                            
11 Semi-private comments, 2015. 
12 Semi-private comments, 2015. 
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containing a similar schedule of oil services, targets and definition of local content. There have also 
been some early successes. According to a member of the Ghanaian government, by 2014 there 
were 6,900 people employed in oil and gas in Ghana; over 90 percent of them Ghanaian. This is 
slightly higher than similar statistics reported in Amoako-Tuffour et al (2015). While 40 percent of 
managers in the industry are Ghanaian, most local employees are in lower and mid-level positions. 
In terms of Ghanaian companies, I was told that a total of $584 million in contracts had been 
awarded to Ghanaian companies; $284 has been awarded to oil service companies and the 
remainder to non-oil companies. However, Ghanaian companies are more likely involved in services 
like catering, hospitality and freight-forwarding, which are lower value.13 Less than a year later, a 
different Ghanaian official said that 4,774 Ghanaians were employed in oil and gas, representing just 
over 70 percent of all employees and that the value of local contracts was over $600 million since 
2009 (see Table 1). However, the official noted that while thousands of contracts have been 
awarded to Ghanaian companies representing 60-75 percent of all contracts, the value of the 
contracts awarded to those companies was less than 5 percent of the total value of the contracts.14 
Table 1 – Value of oil industry contracts awarded to Ghanaian companies 
 
Source: Petroleum Commission 
                                                            
13 Semi-private comments, 2014. 
14 Semi-private comments, 2015. 
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As a source at the Petroleum Commission explains, the current thinking of the Ghanaian government 
is that there were missed local content opportunities in Ghana’s past with mining, 
telecommunications, the West African gas pipeline and gas infrastructure, and with the first oil find 
in 2007. The informant stated at an oil industry event that the audience would be ‘appalled’ by the 
lack of community benefit from gold mining. The Jubilee field, the official argued, employed a 
‘revenue-focused approach’ to resource extraction in which the government chose the cheapest and 
fastest route to first oil and paid little attention to value addition. Instead, it relied on taxes and 
royalties for developmental benefits. However with newer oil fields, Ghana has moved to an ‘in-
country focused’ approach, which prioritizes long term value and takes lower revenue in order to 
have higher in-country value.15  
 
Although similar to the Nigerian law, the GLCL is weaker in that it has fewer provisions to avoid 
locals acting as fronts for foreign companies and fewer regulations that promote job creation over 
indigenous ownership. Unlike Nigeria’s law, the GLCL does little to stop local companies sub-
contracting services from foreign companies, does not require local companies in joint ventures to 
own any of the capital equipment, and does not address the issue of local companies importing 
goods manufactured abroad. According to an official with the Petroleum Commission, they do check 
into the obligations, payments and contractual relations local companies have with joint venture 
partners. If they ever find company acting as a front, the official said, they would report the 
company to the police. To date, it does not appear this has happened.16 Given that the Petroleum 
Commission is receiving hundreds of reports annually from companies and that according to their 
own figures over 200 Ghanaian companies have been awarded contracts by the oil industry since 
2009, it seems difficult to imagine that they can be very rigorous in their enforcement and it is not 
surprising that AECT has concluded that there is a ‘high risk of fronting and “foreign local 
                                                            
15 Semi-private comments, 2015. 
16 Semi-private comments, 2015. 
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partnership” in the industry’, especially when it comes to requirements for local equity exploration 
and production (2015: 15). 
 
The GLCL gives preference to local companies where the costs are within 10 percent, similar 
preference to what is awarded in Nigeria but less than the 20-30 percent preference that Angolan 
companies may receive in practice over competing tenders (Ovadia, 2012). The GLCL also replicates 
some of the problems with Nigeria’s NCA in defining and measuring local content. The weakening of 
the GLCL suggests that with time, international capital has found new ways of organising and 
watering down the aspects of LCPs it deems most unfavourable.  
 
A final concern is the impact LCPs are having in communities in Ghana’s Western Region where 
petroleum operations are taking place. Calling local content and business involvement the ‘the 
weakest link’ in Ghana’s oil and gas industry, Panford writes: ‘At the current pace of local business 
participation and employment of nationals, the multiplier benefits from oil will take a long time to 
trickle down to the teeming masses of unemployed Ghanaians, including more than 300,000 youths 
who enter the labor market each year’ (2015: 88). In his study of the Enterprise Development Centre 
in Takoradi, Ablo concludes: ‘the EDC project could be essential in promoting local entrepreneurial 
activities in the sector. However, at its current scale, the impact of the EDC project on the wider 
Ghanaian economy is limited’ (2015: 326). More research is needed to understand the impact of 
petroleum operations—even deep offshore—on nearby communities.17  
 
4. Local Content and In-Country Value: New Actors and Debates 
Local content promotion has integrated itself into the international oil industry in ways that a 
decade ago would have seemed quite unlikely. The concept has currency well beyond Africa and oil 
                                                            
17 Some good work on this topic with reference to Ghana has been done by Ayelazuno (2014) and Ackah-
Baidoo (2013). 
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and gas. It is on the agenda for countries from Brazil, Mexico and Chile to Oman, Kazakhstan and 
Indonesia. Major oil industry conferences such as the Global Local Content Summit18 and the Global 
Local Content Council’s Annual Summit19 and the World NOC’s Local Content Congress20 compete to 
attract delegates from government agencies and multinational corporations willing to pay thousands 
of dollars per person in registration fees so they can learn about the latest trends. Attending events 
like these was an important source of primary data for this study.  
 
4.1 ‘In-Country Value’ and Debates Around ‘Win-Win’ LCPs 
In recent years, Oman has led the way in promoting its vision of ‘in-country value’ (ICV), which 
appears to shift the emphasis from local employment and expatriate worker quotas to a more 
business-friendly approach focused on the oil and gas supply chain. This approach seems to have 
worked to further water down the binding regulations and mandatory participation of local 
companies in newer local content strategies. In-country value may also suggest a movement away 
from granting any kind of domestic preference to companies that are not price competitive with 
international companies. While there is widespread agreement that indigenous firms must supply 
goods and services of the same quality as international companies, some margin (normally 10 
percent but sometimes more as in the case of Angola) is given to indigenous companies in Angola, 
Nigeria and Ghana. However, such policies are less common in newer local content regulations and 
are among the most controversial aspects of LCPs. 
 
Focusing on ICV and economically productive activity can lead to very interesting and potentially 
important discussions about the nature of value and what is considered to be productive economic 
activity. Nevertheless, the term ‘in-country value’ serves to build broader consensus around LCPs 
between national governments, foreign capital and national and international civil society (including 
                                                            
18 http://www.localcontentsummit.com/ 
19 http://www.glccsummit.com/ 
20 http://www.terrapinn.com/conference/nocs-local-content-congress/index.stm 
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NGOs, labour unions, business associations, etc.). Most importantly, ICV emphasises the idea that 
enhancing local elite ownership is not necessarily developmental, but rather is reflective of the ‘dual 
nature’ of local content policies (Ovadia, 2012). The notion of ICV works alongside the adoption of 
broad, non-targeted local content objectives in the sense that such policies are popular and ‘feel 
good’ yet do not harm any particular interest group. 
 
In-country value, along with ‘shared value creation’ (a term preferred by the OECD) and discourses 
of ‘win-win’ opportunities for ‘public-private’ cooperation, has begun to replace the concept of ‘local 
content’ in discussions facilitated by IOCs and various international institutions for both petroleum 
and mineral extraction. In most African countries—especially new oil-producing countries—ICV may 
mean stressing small and medium sized local enterprises and more in-country activity for larger 
multinational firms. However, while there are some aspects of local content policy that will be ‘win-
win’ and involve shared value creation, there are other aspects of local content that may be national 
development objectives but may simply not be wins for international companies. Similarly, there are 
other aspects that may only be beneficial in the long-term, yet companies may not view as beneficial 
(profitable) because they are primarily concerned with short-term gains. For example, as discussed 
at a local content conference in London in 2015, IOCs may have minimal interest in providing 
advanced training to their staff because those individuals may then leave the firm with their new 
skills in search of more lucrative employment. For the state however, that individual will continue to 
pay tax if they remain employed in-country and even if they seek employment abroad will likely still 
send hard currency back home. Therefore, the state has a much greater interest in promoting 
training and human capacity development than do IOCs. 
 
The most significant shift in the past 2-3 years for local content in Africa has not been the move to 
consider in-country value or petroleum value chains, but rather the development of new petroleum 
regimes with local content provisions in countries that have recently discovered petroleum  
20 
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resources. As in Ghana, for those that did not have previously significant oil industries, there has 
been a scramble to construct a legal framework for petroleum extraction. What follows is a 
consideration of African countries that have been implementing new local content policies since 
2013.  
 
Recent oil and gas discoveries have raised enormous expectations in Uganda, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Kenya and Liberia. As shown in Figure 2, none of these countries have entered into 
significant production since their oil and gas discoveries (though some do produce minor amounts of 
petroleum resources). Despite the recent drop in oil prices, all of these countries are expecting a 
major new revenue stream to come online within the next few years and are also hoping to increase 
the developmental benefit of petroleum and avoid the resource curse through the implementation 
of LCPs. There are major variations in these countries’ approaches to local content. All policies 
contain hiring and training provisions. Additionally, they all privilege local companies in contracting 
and local ownership in terms of equity participation in oil exploration and production as well as oil 
services. However, differences exist in terms of whether they use quotas and targets and whether or 
not local companies are protected from international competition on price. Overall, the tone of the 
new LCPs seems friendlier to international capital while the regulations do not seem as detailed or 
as easy to enforce. The definition of a local or indigenous company is not always provided while well-
known pitfalls around the problems of ‘fronting’ and measurement of local content are generally not 
properly addressed. While this comparison cannot account for changes made to policies that are not 
finalised yet, it does suggest that countries may not be getting or accepting good advice when it 
comes to best practices for LCPs. 
 
4.2 Uganda 
Before the discovery of oil and gas in Uganda, there was no specific legislation or deliberate policy 
drive to promote local content. The Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act of 
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2013 stipulates that ‘contractors and subcontractors shall give preference to goods which are 
produced or available in Uganda and services which are rendered by Ugandan citizens and 
companies’.6 However, not only is there no definition of local content in the act, there is also no 
definition of a local company to clarify if this term means a company registered in Uganda or owned 
by Ugandan citizens. The act also contains provisions about the employment and training of locals, 
however it does not mention any penalties for non-compliance. 
 
Uganda has moved more slowly than other countries—possibly deliberately due to an 
acknowledgement of its lack of capacity. In 2008, a ‘National Oil & Gas Policy for Uganda’ (MEMD, 
2008) was produced and endorsed by the cabinet that recommended putting in place a regulatory 
framework for what Uganda calls ‘national content’. A 2011 report by the Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Development (MEMD, 2011) provided recommendations for a national content policy, 
including a section on definitions that has since been refined to the definition used by the Ministry: 
‘value addition to the [Ugandan] economy through the use by the petroleum industry of materials 
produced or available in Uganda and services provided by Ugandans and Ugandan firms’.21 Although 
the 2011 study was not approved at the cabinet level, it was the basis for a National Content Policy 
and an implementation Strategy and Plan, development by the Petroleum Exploration and 
Development Department within the Ministry. Additionally, a National Content Coordinating Unit 
has been created in the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, referred to as the ‘National 
Content Steering Committee’. This committee, chaired by the Ministry’s Permanent Secretary, is 
now producing draft regulations arising out of the primary laws on the upstream (Petroleum Act 
2013) and downstream (Petroleum Refining Act 2013) sectors. Speaking in early 2015, a member of 
the Steering Committee, stated that the regulations would be available in late 2015.22 As of early 
2016, they had not been made public. 
                                                            
21 According to an official in the Ministry, this is the text of the definition in Uganda’s as yet unpublished draft 
local content regulations (Semi-private comments, 2015). 
22 Semi-private comments, 2015. 
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Some studies have been done that try to project the potential benefit of national content in Uganda. 
Analyses by Kjær (2013) and Hansen et al (2014) use estimates from the Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Development’s 2011 study. The study suggests that ‘the share of national content during the 
phase of exploration so far, is presumably low: probably around 15 percent’ (2011: 6). The tentative 
nature of the estimate and the fact that Nigeria struggled for 50 years to achieve 5 percent national 
content suggests this number may not be too reliable, particularly given the study’s 
acknowledgement that ‘manufacturing does not play any significant role in the Ugandan economy… 
This means that national content development and industrial capacity building will have to build on 
a rather weak industrial base’ (MEMD, 2011: 7). However, recent statements by officials from the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development do claim that Ugandan companies are currently 
winning over a quarter of total spend by value of contracts. 
 
Low levels of manufacturing do not preclude local content gains. The 2011 study forecasts over 
US$10 billion in investments, suggesting at least 10,000 jobs will be created at peak construction, 
leading to around 1,700 permanent jobs (MEMD, 2011: 6, 22). The report, however, seems to focus 
only on heavy manufacturing and does not account for national content in service provision and the 
number of direct and indirect jobs that could potentially be created. In this respect, without 
estimating potential employment, the study notes that Tullow Oil reports a total of 550 Ugandan 
suppliers providing goods and services and winning 38 percent of all contracts by value (MEMD, 
2011: 19).  
 
In terms of early criticisms that have been made by other scholars, Hansen et al note an IOC concern 
with the idea that the Minister will likely have the power to withdraw or refuse to issue a license for 
a sub-contractor. They suggest it may mean IOCs are not free ‘to choose the best sub-contractors’. 
Citing Buur’s (2014) work on elite capture of new economic opportunities, they also express concern 
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that such capture can block SME development. However, it is not clear that these are negative 
outcomes. In fact, they are common provisions in LCPs in Angola, Nigeria and Ghana. Without 
entering into arguments about the necessity of industrial policies that help local elites in the short 
term, it is worth mentioning that the 2011 Ugandan study did find that local ownership is not key, as 
long as value addition is undertaken in Uganda.   
 
4.3 Mozambique 
Mozambique passed a Petroleum Law in August 2014 that privileges local companies and joint 
ventures in the awarding of concessions, requires foreigners to partner with Mozambicans 
(individuals or companies 51 percent owned by Mozambican nationals) to provide goods and 
services, gives preference to Mozambican goods and services of comparable quality to foreign goods 
and services where the cost difference does not exceed 10 percent. In this sense, Mozambique’s 
LCPs are stronger than Uganda’s and comparable to Angola, Nigeria and Ghana. There are 
requirements to provide training of Mozambican nationals, while quotas for foreign workers are 
found in other legislation. While the law does not address targets or measurement of local content, 
the most concerning aspect of the law is that current petroleum operations are exempted from the 
law and subject to their own Special Regime. This regime does require local content plans to be 
submitted to and approved by the government, however it states that ‘no preference needs to be 
given to Mozambican suppliers’ in most circumstances. Mozambican authorities have also signalled 
their desire to ensure a positive environment for investment in the oil and gas industry with what 
one official called a ‘Total Positive Sum Initiative’ for industry, government, entrepreneurs and civil 
society.23  
 
The Petroleum Law, however, was not intended to be the final word on local content. In July 2015, 
the National Petroleum Institute (INP), which regulates the sector, produced draft local content 
                                                            
23 Semi-private comments, 2014. 
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regulations with assistance from the Norwegian government. Article 45 contains basic reporting 
requirements around employment of locals while Article 49 would finally put in place a 10 percent 
preference for indigenous companies. The remainder of the regulation contains clauses on domestic 
supply (Article 106), fines for failure to comply (Article 115) and training (Articles 116 and 117). 
Significantly, Article 115 specifies a maximum fine of roughly US$125,000, which does not seem 
large enough likely to enforce compliance by major IOCs. 
 
Noting that ‘over US$25 billion is expected to be invested by 2020 for oil and gas companies to reach 
initial production’, a USAID report on local content in Mozambqiue breaks down LCPs across various 
(and sometimes conflicting) pieces of Mozambican legislation, noting policies related to 
employment, finance, procurement and corporate social responsibility (Kooker, 2015: 1).24 While the 
legal framework for local content in Mozambique is already extraordinarily complex, it may get more 
complex with news that the Ministry of Economy and Finance is writing new local content law to 
apply to the whole economy.25 The new law may simplify things by overriding or superseding any 
other law on any issue pertaining to local content, however it is not clear how this would work. The 
law was being drafted in early 2015 with a draft supposed to be ready by June, however again this 
has been delayed—potentially due to the continued decline in oil prices. Once this law is in place, 
various government ministries and agencies will write supporting regulations for their sector with 
petroleum-specific regulations possibly being produced anew in 2016 or beyond. News of this 
development creates uncertainty for investors, which may be a blow to the country given the 
changing investment climate for oil and gas since 2014.  
 
 
 
                                                            
24 The relationship between local content and corporate social responsibility is worthy of further discussion, 
however such a discussion cannot take place within the scope for this paper. 
25 Semi-private comments, 2015. 
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4.4 Tanzania 
Tanzania’s draft local content regulations seem to be the least rigorous in Sub-Saharan Africa to 
date. Released in 2014, they state that foreign oil companies will be ‘encouraged’ to work with a 
local partner. They ‘encourage multinationals to bring their global oilfield services and equipment to 
Tanzania’ and ask that multinationals ‘ensure’ training and technology transfer to local employees. 
They also specify that where the bids ‘are otherwise equal, the bid containing the highest level of 
Tanzanian content shall be selected’, but do not explain how this will be measured. The draft policy 
does require preference be given to the employment of Tanzanians, however they must have ‘the 
requisite expertise or qualifications’. Where foreigners are employed, it requires a succession plan to 
a Tanzanian national must be submitted with the work permit application. It also requires all 
operators ‘as far as practicable, to use goods and services produced by or provided in Tanzania by 
Tanzanian owned businesses’. While this language seems vague enough to be almost voluntary, the 
policy does suggest there may be a margin of price preference prescribed by legislation.8  
 
The passage of the Petroleum Act in 2015 did put in place certain reporting requirements for the 
newly created Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Authority (PURA). While the new law states a 
preference for goods and services available in Tanzania, when these are not available they confuse 
the definition of an indigenous company by giving preference to joint ventures where Tanzanians 
own 25 percent or more of the company. With the 2015 elections concluded, it is likely a new 
version of the draft regulations will soon be released. In Semi-private comments, the Chairman of 
the Tanzanian NOC assured the oil and gas industry that as part of the new focus on shared value 
creation, the draft framework has been discussed with IOCs and that they had ‘mostly positive 
feedback’. Reflecting the new norm of ‘win-win’ policies, he went on to say ‘There were some 
disagreements but we had good discussions and I believe that when the final policy is passed the 
IOCs will be happy. I believe both sides will get a good deal’. 
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4.5 Kenya 
Kenya’s legislation may be less voluntary than Tanzania’s, but it seems that the maximum fine 
named in the draft Petroleum (Exploration, Development & Production) Bill 2014 is one million 
Kenya shillings (under US$10,000), which is not likely to be much of a deterrent. The draft Petroleum 
Exploration, Development & Production (Local Content) Regulations, also of 2014, have some 
penalties as high as five million shillings and suggest that the proposed Upstream Petroleum 
Regulatory Authority will alternatively be able to cancel contracts and possibly imprison violators. 
However, these are quite extreme measures that are not likely to be enacted. According to a senior 
Kenyan official speaking in 2014, the government was planning to pass the Petroleum Bill and Local 
Content Regulations in 2015, however to date they are still pending.26 The regulations call for 
detailed local content plans to be submitted in the model of Nigeria and Ghana covering 
employment and training, research and development, technology transfer and legal and financial 
services. In this respect, they are stronger than, for example, Uganda’s laws, which do not have 
strong technology transfer regulations. They also contain specific sections on local fronting that are 
absent from the other new LCPs. Controversially however, the local content regulations contain a 
schedule that is virtually identical to the schedule in the NCA and GLCL. Even more so than in the 
cases of Ghana and certainly Nigeria, it seems completely impossible that the targets in Kenya’s draft 
law could be met in the short to medium term. 
 
4.6 Liberia 
Finally, the Liberian Petroleum Exploration & Production Act of 2013 makes only vague reference to 
hiring and training of Liberians, a preference for local ownership of participation in oil blocks, the 
reservation of onshore blocks for Liberian companies and a preference to Liberian companies for 
contracts under US$3 million if they are cost competitive with international companies. While 
national consultations were held and a committee struck that included the Ministry of Mining and 
                                                            
26 Semi-private comments, 2014. 
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Energy to prepare new local content legislation, the National Oil Company of Liberia (NOCAL) seems 
to have taken over the process and is operating in secrecy. Reporting to the President, NOCAL is 
both regulator and NOC, as in the case of Sonangol. A senior government official who was part of the 
committee that was struck said in 2015 that ‘NOCAL has been very untransparent… Now it’s all 
closed. I don’t know what’s happening with the new LC law or what will be included… decisions are 
taking place behind closed doors’.27 Speaking to an oil and gas industry event in 2014, a board 
member of the National Oil Company of Liberia emphasised the government’s business-friendly 
‘win-win’ approach and role in promoting a ‘stable legal climate’ and ‘table, favourable tax regime’.28 
In June 2015, the CEO of NOCAL stated that she expected the law to be published by the end of the 
summer and that it would involve IOCs supplying local linkages plan, which is already a requirement 
of Liberia’s Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs). She went on to say a new approach was needed 
that was more collaborative and involved working with IOCs because business considered its 
previous petroleum regime to be inadequate.29 
 
As a concluding aspect of this study, it is also necessary to compare the petroleum agreements in 
new oil producers. The terms of these agreements vary, but not as considerably as other local 
content requirements. As shown in Figure 2, petroleum agreements have been located and reviewed 
for all five countries. Uganda’s PSA with Tullow Oil contains provisions around preference for 
domestic use of oil (Article 18). Article 20 requires preference be given to goods produced or 
available in Uganda and services rendered by Ugandan citizens and companies. However, these 
goods must be equal to or better than imported goods and services with regard to quality, price and 
availability. Finally, Article 21 contains provisions and spending commitments for training and 
employment. Mozambique uses concession contracts instead of PSAs/PSCs. They contain provisions 
on employment and training (Article 18) that specify standard spending commitments. However, 
                                                            
27 Semi-private comments, 2015. 
28 Semi-private comments, 2014. 
29 Semi-private comments, 2015. 
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Mozambique’s contracts for the Rovuma Basin do not contain any other local content requirements. 
Taken together with the decree-law for Rovuma, it seems Mozambique has failed to learn from 
Ghana’s experience with the jubilee field and has sacrificed local content for revenues in its first 
major gas developments.  
 
In the case of Tanzania, LCPs are absent from current PSAs but can be found in the 2013 model PSA, 
which is intended for future developments. The model PSA has requirements around training and 
employment (Articles 19-21), which include spending commitments that are somewhat higher than 
in Uganda and Mozambique. Under Article 21, contractors must also submit an annual local content 
plan. Kenya’s PSCs contain similar sections on training and employment with similar spending 
commitments to Uganda and Mozambqiue (Article 13), have obligations regarding supply of crude 
oil for domestic consumption (Article 29), and give preference to Kenyan goods and services ‘as long 
as their prices, quality, quantities and timeliness… are comparable’ to foreign ones (Article 31). 
Lastly, Article 29 of Liberia’s PSCs contain training and employment provisions similar to the above 
with slightly higher spending commitments. They also require operators to provide NOCAL with a 
project linkages plan and to update it with the annual development and production plan. 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Taken together, all five of the most recent local content strategies in Africa represent a weakening of 
LCPs in favour of a more pro-business agenda and avoidance of key issues around definitions and 
measurement that have been of concern in Angola and Nigeria. In other words, ‘hard’ regulatory 
policies are being replaced with ‘softer’ voluntary ones. With Tanzania and Liberia in particular there 
seems to be a watering-down of key mandatory provisions of LCPs in order to achieve a supposedly 
‘win-win’ consensus with international oil companies. It is true that both firms and countries can 
benefit from upgrading along the petroleum value chain. What remains to be seen is whether in-
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country shared value creation as promoted by international institutions and enacted by African 
states serves national development or whether the value ends up being shared by international and 
national capitalists to the exclusion of everyone else. 
 
The most recent oil price shock has demonstrated the folly of relying on the revenues from 
extractive industries to bring about meaningful social and economic development. Only an approach 
that promotes economic diversification and plans for a future beyond hydrocarbons can serve as a 
justification for taking those hydrocarbons out of the ground. However, it is precisely when the price 
of oil falls that new efforts are made by oil companies to sacrifice local content in the name of the 
bottom line.  
 
This paper has identified several elements of best practice from LCPs across Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Strong LCPs impose mandatory targets but ensures that they are within reach of a strategy that is 
well-implemented by strong, capable and independent institutions. They mandate investment in 
human capacity development, regular reports on progress to government and preferably to civil 
society as well, give preference to quality local suppliers of goods and services even when they are 
not fully cost competitive, require companies to invest in research and development, ensure 
technology transfer is occurring, contain meaningful enforcement provisions and penalties, 
incentivize foreign companies to add more value to their activities in-country, and prioritize local 
content in sectors of oil services like engineering design, finance, legal services, and fabrication that 
have extend into the non-oil economy. Whether they come in the form of legislation, regulations or 
contractual obligations that form the part of petroleum agreements, LCPs must be consistent, 
binding on all players, and implemented in a transparent manner by competent and sincere officials 
in the public and private sectors.     
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Many aspects of local content can be beneficial in the long run to IOCs as well as to states and their 
citizens. Some however are necessary strategic objectives and economic imperatives for countries 
seeking to ensure a developmental benefit as they convert a resource under the ground 
(hydrocarbons) into another kind of resource (hard currency for the state treasury). Oil wealth does 
not produce free money and it is not a windfall. Once this conversion occurs, a resource no longer 
exists. If this process harms people’s livelihoods or leaves the entire country worse off, the obvious 
response is that it should not be undertaken.  
 
This response is not obvious to an international oil company. Holding a primary duty to its 
shareholders, an IOC is simply pursuing it natural objective in attempting to reduce the costs of 
doing business—particularly in a period of low oil prices. Yet, IOCs have generally been supportive of 
LCPs and raised only a few objections to particular requirements—for example dedollarization in 
Angola or the requirement to contribute 1 percent of contract values to a dedicated local content 
fund. The largest oil service companies such as Schlumberger, Haliburton, Fluor and others have also 
come to be supportive as well, as evidenced by a conversation with a lobbyist from an organization 
that represents six of the biggest global oil service companies, who told me that large transnational 
companies do not have major objections to local content policies. The main concern they do have is 
being able to bring their technology out with them when they leave, which demonstrates again how 
some aspects of local content are simply never going to be ‘win-win’.30 Greater resistance has come 
from Western governments—particularly the British and American governments. In 2010, the US 
embassy in Abuja eagerly supplied me with a list of the top ten ‘issues’ with Nigeria’s local content 
legislation. Anecdotally, I have been told on multiple occasions that the US, and to a lesser extent 
the UK, oppose LCPs and have pressured governments to weaken key clauses.31  
 
                                                            
30 Semi-private comments, 2015. 
31 Semi-private comments, 2015. 
32 
 
What must be opposed are approaches to resource extraction that further the very real dynamics of 
a resource curse—a curse that a growing body of political and economic scholarship is showing can 
be combatted with the right policies, institutional configurations and alliances. This article has 
attempted to provide a comparative analysis of LCPs. Such an analysis is only the beginning. Going 
forward, new research is required on the role of civil society in petro-development and on 
empirically measuring and verifying the impact and benefit of various approaches to local content. 
This is an even greater task that is many years away from being feasible.  
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